cultural nationalists
If we limit history to the recitation of facts it remains somewhat distanced and unconnected to our lives in the present. One of the areas where this link between the past and the present needs investigation is that of religion in the past and now. Earlier, modern historians had limited the history of religion to studying what the sacred texts of each religion say, and to information on how the religion was organized. But the significant aspect from a historical perspective is also to ascertain what this organization grew out of and how it impinged on society. This has been a recent subject of study. When one begins to think about the relationship of religion and society in these terms then one also begins to see how crucial the analysis of this link to the assessment of society as a whole is. The significance is even more noticeable in the way religion is used in present times in various forms of nationalism. The changes in the discipline of history were making it intellectually far more stimulating and nuanced than before. Other demands came to be made on the knowledge of historians. But apart from this, history—more than the other human sciences—was essential to political ideologies that appeal to the past for legitimacy. This it does because the identity of a society in modern times draws on its perceptions of history, and this is particularly marked in the experience of nationalism. The questioning of colonial and nationalist interpretations has also to do with the historical change brought about in the process of modernization, in which we have been and are currently, participating. The crucial fact of the change is that the survival of a nation is dependant on its preferably being a secular democracy, a mutation that is ultimately inevitable, irrespective of how many decades it may take. Among the dramatic changes is the emergence of capitalism (which it was once thought could be bypassed), accompanied by industrialization. The nature of these changes could differ through the experience of the market economy, neo-liberalism and globalization, but change there has to be. This unsettles existing social norms and structures in variant ways in different societies, an aspect that should be treated as the logical counterpart to modernization brought by capitalism. What is open to us is to avoid the brutalities of the change. For this we have to focus on enhancing the potential of the more humane aspects of this mutation, a focus that is often deliberately set aside. We allow the brutalities to overtake us and thereby annul what could be the more creative aspirations. I am assuming that it may be possible to have a substantial change in the political economy without brutalities. The relevance of the questions posed is bound to affect the social sciences. The coming of nationalism in India, as an activity opposed to colonial rule and moving towards the expulsion of the colonial power, led inevitably to inducting history as foundational to the ideology. At first this was to be just the intellectual ammunition needed to give an inclusive identity to nationalism, but parallel to it were the identities of religious communities with a political agenda that often corroded nationalist ideology and surfaced as communalisms. Identity Nationalism implies the coalescing of smaller groups into a larger inclusive identity that incorporates the lesser ones. The coalescing includes that of the territories of the smaller groups. It refers itself back to a shared history of all those that constitute the nation. The Indian national movement was based on these ideas. It broke when religion was given priority, splitting the groups that had earlier come together, resulting in the division of the territory and ultimately the denial of a shared history, all of which reversed the constituents of nationalism. Nations are not easily forged since many identities have to be coalesced. History is thought to provide past identities and in the process history comes to be contested. Often enough we are imposing present identities onto the past. Those that select a single identity from the past—be it religion, caste, language or whatever—and then project it as their take on national identity are in fact negating nationalism. Identity politics, where one identity is chosen, is often associated with extremism of a kind that harbours fundamentalism and destroys the more positive changes expected of secular democratic nationalism. Historical change brings various communities into prominence and democratically by ensuring that all citizens have equal rights, and none is considered as a primary citizen with special rights. The manipulation of history to legitimize community identity becomes essential to communalism demanding special rights, the more so when it dominates politics. The contestation is between historians trying to defend history from communal manipulation and those insisting on ideologies that support fundamentalist versions of the past. The history that has raised the maximum controversy in this context is that of pre-modern India and particularly that of the early period.
Nationalism
Eric Hobsbawm encapsulates the link between history and nationalism when he states that historians are to nationalism what poppy-growers are to heroin addicts! All nationalisms require and search for utopias from the past and the more remote periods of history are chosen, partly because there is less detailed evidence on such periods and therefore it is possible to fan tasize more freely about them. Except that these days we historians, with our new methodologies, tend to disallow the fantasy and run into problems with the fantasy-makers. Political ideologies focusing in particular on what they call ‘cultural nationalism’—and this is common to many societies apart from the Indian— blatantly exploit history. In India there have been and continue to be a variety of ideologies that claim to be forms of nationalism. These include the avowedly secular inclusive Indian national movement against colonialism, whose secular credentials by and large held, although occasionally they were somewhat opaque. But this more secular Indian nationalism seems to be slowly receding, being overtaken by various religious nationalisms such as the Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh—incorporating varieties of fundamentalism. The objection to applying the label of nationalism to what may be viewed as these ‘lesser breeds without the law’ is well taken.Nationalism is secular and the term should refer only to the one Indian nationalism. But the lesser ones have grown, nourished on the theory sponsored by colonial thinking that the religion of a community was and has always been, its identity, and that this qualified it to be called a nation. Politicians such as V.D. Savarkar and M.A. Jinnah, toeing in their later years the line of British colonial policy, regularly referred to the two nations of the Hindus and the Muslims. Religious communal organizations have appropriated the label of nationalisms—thus the references to Hindu, Muslim and Sikh nationalisms. Strictly these are not nationalisms but fundamentalist religious identities. They are now referred to as nationalisms since that is the term they claim, even though it does not apply. Both Hindu and Muslim communalists had their organizational bases in the 1920s such as the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha. Despite it being in essence anti-nationalist, the two-nation theory is now effectively not questioned, if anything it is once again being endorsed by some political parties.
Communalisms
Communal Nationalism
The nationalism of a religious community is not Indian nationalism, irrespective of which community it may refer to. This argument was made in the 1940s and quite correctly against ‘Muslim nationalists’, but seventy years later a man proclaiming himself to be a ‘Hindu nationalist’ is taken as synonymous with an Indian nationalist. When nationalism is reduced to identity politics and priority is given to a religious community, then it follows that the history sought will be a history that focuses on the particular religious community that is being projected as that of the primary citizen. So Hindu nationalism/communalism refers itself back to the pre-Islamic period and claims an unbroken continuity from Harappan times, tracing its origins to the golden age of the early past when Hinduism is said to have been dominant. Questioning this theory is not welcomed and those that do so are dismissed as ‘Marxists’, intended as a form of abuse (!), or else targeted with the most crass denunciation. The golden age, it is maintained, was terminated by ‘the Muslim invasions’ followed by a period of tyrannical Muslim rulers whose actions are portrayed in brutal terms.
Muslim nationalism/communalism, familiar in Pakistan, traces the origin of its history (subsequent to the Indus Civilization)to Mohammad bin Qasim’s campaigns in Sind in the eighth century AD, and the history prior to this is seen as largely irrelevant. Some historians in Pakistan disagree with this position, but the focus remains mostly on the history of the subcontinent under Islamic rulers. Muslim rule is praised as having benefitted India. And so the story goes on and on.
Some Sikh nationalists wanted the history of the Punjab to start with Guru Nanak. The attempt at an exclusive focus on Shivaji in Maharashtra derives from a similar kind of sentiment.
Religious organizations the world over have never been averse to playing politics, accessing and controlling power and setting themselves up as parallel governing structures. The Catholic-Protestant conflicts in Europe are an obvious example. This has also been known to the history of religions in India, although until recently historians have tended not to examine this aspect of organized religion, possibly because the conflicts were not on the same scale as those of the European. Now the scale has become more apparent what with political parties organizing communal riots, destroying mosques and banning books that do not conform to the views of religious conservatism. Any threat to the control of religion is proclaimed as a threat to the religion itself. No distinction is made between the religion of an individual and the political use of religious organizations. Yet this distinction is crucial to any society. An individual has the right to her belief and her way of worshipping a deity of her choice, provided this does not harm anyone else in that society. This of course is the ideal although it may not always work in such a harmonious manner. Some forms of worship can cause conflicts. Religion encourages community worship that bonds the worshippers and perhaps serves psychological needs. Some aspects of religion can be humane and conducive to the well-being of everyone but these tend to receive lip service from the majority. Sometimes it is fear of the unknown that creates a God, or alternately the awe of the universe that is overwhelming. Mystery is perceived by the individual and can be articulated in religious poetry and music.
ORGANIZED RELIGION AND COMMUNALISM
Organized religion, however, is different from the religion of the individual. Religious organizations may begin with the finest values but many succumb to other pressures and turn into tyrannical bodies. When this happens religion moves away from its root purposes and turns into an organization encouraging hatred and violence and opposing the initial values with which it had itself started. The defence of such a religion then requires an ‘enemy’, generally chosen from within society although it can be external to it—the Sunni fundamentalists attack the Shi’as, supporters of Hindutva organized by the Sangh Parivar attack Christians and Muslims. Human rights, social welfare or social justice are not the concerns of such religious organizations. Welfare relates only to their followers, if at all. Justice is subjected to observing the code of the religion. Belief and ritual get subsumed into religiosity.
All this becomes an area of contention against secularism, that neither denies nor rejects religion, but insists on the priority of social ethics based on equal and universal human rights, and social justice based on uniform civil laws. Religion is not required for these values to prevail.
Religiosity
Religiosity, often described as excessive religiousness, is of course different from religion. The end purpose of religiosity is seldom worship per se, but is more often the means of demonstrating wealth and power. Religiosity binds the gullible with superstitions and ensnares them with the false promises of fake gurus thriving on media attention and magnanimous donations. Those who have faith and seek genuine teachers are frequently left by the wayside. One has only to see what Hindutva and the Sangh Parivar have done to Hinduism, what the Taliban and the mullahs have done to Islam, what the supporters of Khalistan have done to Sikhism, and what the Goa Inquisition did to local catholic Christians, to realize the change. The secular critique is not of religion as such, but of those who exploit religious faith for political and other gain.
RELIGION AND POWER
The history of a religion therefore, is not limited to what the texts may say. Many religious texts incorporate the same values of moral behavior, tolerance and discouraging violence. Historically, new religions emerge when there are ideological differences that result in social conflict and the new religion attempts to douse the embers. The problem comes when the religion is associated with those in power, for then, religion also becomes a party to political competition or to moral corruption where it prevails. The historian therefore has to constantly place both the texts and the activities of a religion, in the context of what is happening in the society to which they refer. The relationship between a religion and its social activities may not always be complimentary to the religion. And when this is exposed, the religious organization tries to stifle the views of those that do so, as we have witnessed in recent decades.
Religious ‘nationalisms and Cultural nationalists
Some religious ‘nationalisms’ resort to the euphemism of calling themselves cultural nationalists, arguing that their organization is neither religious nor political but cultural. The implication is that ‘culture’ is neutral and apolitical. This makes no sense, as culture relates itself to social groups and their selfexpression. The statement is in any case denied by such nationalisms generally being the pivot of those political parties that are based on religious identities. This identity is defined by the social strata whose cultures are being appropriated by the particular organization Culture also has an identity defined by whose culture is being appropriated by the particular organization.
An obvious example is the RSS, the ideological propagator of Hindutva. One of its leaders, B.S. Moonje, stated that its organization was modelled on the Italian Fascisti, which together with Mussolini, had greatly impressed him. Its continuous stepping into political waters could hardly hide its political intentions. These are now amply clear in its role as the pivot of the BJP. Such ‘cultural nationalisms’ oriented to religious identities have had a long innings.
Another manifestation of cultural nationalism comes from the Indian diaspora that uses various Internet websites run by certain NRI organizations to mobilize opinion and spread ‘the message’. There is an element of pathos in their clinging to what they believe is the idea of India, even if it is passé. This is strongly coloured by the religious nationalisms of the home country, be they Hindu, Muslim or Sikh and these religious nationalisms are in turn reinforced by the belief and the substantial financial contributions that come from abroad. It is projected as their claim to a culture superior to that of the host countries where they have settled. Alienated as they are from the host culture the image of a utopian past of the homeland is evoked, even if it is an out-of-date one. The enemy however is not the host country—which it dare not be since the concerned NRIs are living there—but those in the home country who oppose the politics of religious fundamentalism. The material success of such NRIs makes them the role model for those of the Indian middle class aspiring to success in the home country, and their ideology is also imbibed by their Indian counterparts. The intention is to redefine the particular religion to make it less flexible and to define civilization in religious terms. The concept of Indian civilization was equated by some European Orientalists with things Hindu and its definition lay in the Hindu religion and the Sanskrit language, and the territorial boundaries of British India, all inherited from colonial scholarship. The concept was not questioned nor was it argued that Indian culture consisted of many strands not just the one. The strikingly unique feature of the plurality of cultures in India, that distinguished Indian civilization, went unheeded in the desperate attempt to identify a single culture and give it priority.
Civilizations and Relogiousity
Today historians recognize that the hallmark of a civilization is not its rigid boundaries but its porosity, and that civilizations can only thrive when there is an inter-connectedness between them that enhances the communication of ideas and practices. That is perhaps one reason why for historians the concept of civilization is something quite else than what was meant by the term in the nineteenth century. The fundamentalist versions of religions mock the idea of religion. For instance, Hindutva replaces the freedom of individual belief by conformity to a uniform belief and practice. Its organization and ideology has suggested the influence of the Semitic religions. It also encourages the community’s competition in religiosity by constant reference to what it constructs as the Hindu tradition. The sensitivity and fluidity of worship in some aspects of Hinduism as prevalent especially among the lesser castes, are brushed aside. Premodern Hinduism had its warts—big and small—as do all religions, but its subtleties were richer than what is now being thrust on its believers. Hindutva is in many ways the antithesis of Hinduism, and aims to create a society that is narrow, bigoted and inward looking, in which the co-existence with those that differ, such as the minority communities of various kinds, is becoming increasingly impossible, as demonstrated by the frequency of communal riots. These inevitably lead to the ghettoization of the targeted community, as has happened subsequent to such riots, and the exclusion of such communities from living in an integrated society, as happened in Gujarat after the communal riots of 2002. Ghettoization, as one knows from the European experience, has the potential of facilitating barbaric solutions, and does solve the problems of differences in patterns of living.
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